
Original Article

The New Aid Architecture in Ghana: Influencing Policy and Practice?

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Abstract This article explores the relationships between the new aid architecture, influenced by the Paris Declaration, and exemplified in Ghana by its new *Aid Policy and Strategy*, and the much longer policy history of donor–Government of Ghana relations in the fields of education and training. The *Aid Policy* hierarchy of preference for general budget support, unearmarked sector budget support and then project aid confronts a very different reality in the education sector where the project approach is very much alive and well. The issue of donor and political influence on Ghana's education policy is traced from the 1990s up to the new Education Strategic Plan (2010–2020). But it is noted that the process of aid influencing education policies is very different from changing educational practice in ordinary classrooms and training centres.

Cet article examine les relations entre la nouvelle architecture d'aide au développement ayant pris forme suite à la Déclaration de Paris, illustrée au Ghana par sa nouvelle 'Politique et Stratégie d'Aide', ainsi que la longue histoire des relations entre le Ghana et les pays donateurs dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la formation. La Politique d'Aide établit une préférence pour un soutien budgétaire global ou bien un soutien budgétaire sectoriel non ciblé plutôt qu'un soutien pour des projets particuliers. Elle est cependant confrontée à une toute autre réalité dans le secteur de l'éducation, où l'approche basée sur des projets spécifiques est bien vivante. Nous abordons la question de l'influence tant de la politique que des pays donateurs sur la politique d'éducation du Ghana depuis les années 1990s jusqu'au nouveau Plan Stratégique d'éducation (2010–2020). On remarque en particulier que le processus d'aide influençant les politiques d'éducation diffère significativement du processus de changement des pratiques éducatives dans les salles de classes et centres de formation ordinaires.

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Background and Introduction

In the enormous flood of papers, meetings and monitoring that has spilled out from the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness of 2005 (OECD, 2005), Ghana was one of no less than 34 countries surveyed the following year (2006) on monitoring the Paris Declaration (OECD, 2006). Ghana was already on the Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) Joint Venture on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, and sufficiently committed to the process to offer to host the Third High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra in 2008. At the end of that meeting in Ghana on fourth September 2008, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) was able to confirm: 'We agree that, by 2010, each of us should meet the commitments we made on aid effectiveness in Paris and today in Accra, and to reach beyond these commitments where we can' (AAA, 2008, p. 7). Ghana was also one of just 21 countries surveyed (Quartey *et al.*, 2010) as part of Phase 2 of the Paris Declaration

Evaluation, the full report of which goes in November 2011 to the fourth and final High-level Forum in Busan, South Korea.

The year 2011 may therefore be an appropriate moment to take stock of the progress towards Paris in Ghana, and not least because Ghana is one of the countries that has duly developed its own aid policy, *Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy, 2011–2015. Towards Middle-Income Status* (GoG, 2010a).¹ Predictably, the aid policy follows all the main dimensions of the Paris Declaration and of the Accra Agenda; it clarifies Ghana's preferred modalities for aid and underlines the many continuing challenges. Significantly, the Ghana Consultative Group/Annual Partnership Meeting 2010 (between the GoG and development partners (DPs)) was subtitled 'Managing the transition to a middle income economy with an emerging oil sector: the role of ODA in sustaining national development' (GoG, 2010b, p. 1). And instead of the usual process of the review of aid performance being focused by donors on the government, Ghana laid out the latest version of its 'development partners – performance assessment framework (DP-PAF)', 'in order to measure the extent to which DPs adhere to agreed principles for aid delivery' (ibid.). This is being applied in a variety of ways to the 23 multilateral and 24 bilateral DPs active in Ghana. It is interesting to note that Ghana intends the DP-PAF framework to apply to all DPs, both the 'traditional' DPs and emerging donors (ibid.). Indeed, a questionnaire on the performance assessment of development partners in Ghana was already sent to all donors in February 2010, 'in order to base international cooperation more symmetrically on mutual accountability' (Gerster and Ashong, 2010, p. 63).²

In this way, the new government (of Atta Mills) is seeking to alter the currently asymmetrical situation in which the GoG has to account to the donors, but not the other way round. It puts it this way in *Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy*:

The absence of an accountability framework leads to a situation of asymmetry. At present, the Government of Ghana is accountable to Development Partners through a series of unharmonized, overlapping and duplicative assessments, reviews, audits, missions and consultations. (GoG, 2010a, p. 14)

With this national framework as background, the present article intends to analyse the formal education sector, along with technical and vocational education and training (TVET), through the lens of Paris, Accra and Ghana's own aid policy and strategy. The purpose is not narrowly to review the current status of Ghana against the 12 indicators and targets of the original Paris Declaration, but rather to use some of key concepts and aid instruments in the Paris language of harmonization, alignment, ownership and mutual accountability as a way of interrogating the situation in the fields of education and training in Ghana. In particular, I want to explore the apparent paradox of the continuation of the project approach in the education sector at a time when policy in general by the GoG has shifted towards general and sector budget support (GBS and SBS). The Paris discourse of project-based approaches or parallel project implementation units may take on somewhat different significance when it is confronted with the reality of long-term DP traditions of providing development assistance.

This corresponds quite closely to the two key interests the Department for International Development (DFID) had in exploring the role of donor partnerships when it set the possible terms of reference for the Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty (RECOUP), in general, and this research on aid partnerships in particular. These were

The long-term impact on education systems in partner countries of prioritising universal primary education by 2015 and other MDGs.

The effectiveness of aid instruments (such as budget support, sector-wide approaches (SWAPS), global funds, Fast Track Initiative (FTI)) on improving educational outcomes. (DFID, 2004, p. 1)

In fact, DFID had been organizing its approach to development assistance through the international development targets of the OECD only since its White Paper on international development of 1997, and these in turn became the millennium development goals (MDGs) after the September 2000 Millennium Summit. Equally, several of the aid instruments such as the FTI or the sector-wide approach (SWAP) only dated from 2002 and from the mid-1990s, respectively. Hence, with multiple changes in both donor and GOG approaches, this article questions the donor ambitions to influence both policy and outcomes.

This study was carried out between 2008 and 2009, during which time two periods of intensive fieldwork were conducted by holding in-depth interviews with the main donors in formal education and TVET and with relevant government officials. The first cycle of interviews was conducted in July 2008, shortly before the AAA Forum. Over 25 donors and government officials were interviewed. The second round of 17 interviews was conducted in March 2009. But between 2008 and 2011, a regular e-mail exchange has been maintained with several of the main agency and government actors, since several key documents such as the education strategic plan (ESP) and *Ghana Aid Policy*, as well as academic analyses, continued to be developed into 2010. Some documents such as the *Aid Policy* and the ESP straddled the shift in government from President Kufuor to Atta Mills in 2008/2009.³

Although the AAA recognized the role of the so-called new development actors, or emerging donors, with their claims about South–South cooperation, and their principle of non-interference in internal affairs, it was not feasible to include any of these new actors in our fieldwork, not least because they were not majorly involved in support to formal education and training at that time.⁴ Interestingly, however, at the very point that the UN summit was reviewing progress on the MDGs on 20–22 September 2010 (including on universal primary education and gender equity), Atta Mills was in China securing multi-billion agreements for investment in oil, gas and infrastructure – roads and railways (www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=194464).⁵

The present article is not only concerned with commenting on the changing influence of the traditional donors on Ghana's policies for education and training, but also with getting behind some of the language of aid instruments and modalities to examine some of the limitations and challenges of impact. Unlike the Indian case, where Colclough and De (2010) have argued that national education policy priorities were determined by India but where there was external influence on implementation and management, it may be possible to argue that for Ghana there has been substantial donor influence on policy at different times, both in formal education and in TVET, but there has continued to be a sharp disconnect between education and training policies and the realities of very poor learning outcomes in formal schools as in technical or vocational training institutes. Beyond the donor influence on policy, there is the backdrop of the changing impact of the different governments (Rawlings, Kufuor and Atta Mills) on the donors, as well as directly on education and training policy.⁶

The central paradox perhaps is that aid instruments have changed a good deal, especially with some of the DPs in Ghana, over the past 10, 15 or more years. But learning outcomes have remained stubbornly appalling. In the words of one long-term US analyst of Ghana's formal school system:

The evidence from Ghana's 2007 National Educational Assessment, the only source of national data on pupil performance in primary schools, is that 90 per cent of pupils cannot solve basic

maths problems and three-quarters of pupils in grade six are unable to read with fluency and comprehension. This is clearly a high priority challenge for Ghana's basic education system. This is what districts, in the evolving decentralized system, must improve. (Hartwell, 2009, p. 3)

Perhaps behind the original DFID question about the effectiveness of different aid instruments in improving educational outcomes was just this kind of situation exemplified in Ghana.

Some Policy History on Aid Coordination in Education in Ghana, Pre-Paris

It is useful to be reminded that aid coordination, including in Ghana, did not start with the Paris Declaration of 2005. Much of the detail of the different early agency initiatives in Ghana is covered in Casely-Hayford and Palmer (2007), but there was a particularly appealing account of the need for donor coordination made by the then minister, Harry Sawyerr (1997). He explains the reason for setting up a special projects management unit (PMU) linked to the Ministry, instead of having a whole series of separate project implementation units.⁷ In a separate paper from the same period by the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA), the PMU is celebrated for making aid more effective:

The PMU has become a forum for all donor-supported projects. It ensures that objectives and timing are strictly adhered to, monies released expeditiously, and activities monitored constantly. The PMU has eliminated inefficiencies in the implementation process and thus advanced the reform to its present stage. (Fobih *et al.*, 1996, p. 75)

From Sawyerr and the ADEA's accounts of the genesis of Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) in 1995 it might appear that Ghana was set to experience an early version of a subsector SWAP. However, despite the PMU and the setting up of a Funding Agency Consultative Panel, the chances for collective action were blown apart by sudden and dramatic changes to the government's estimates of the costs of FCUBE.⁸

There were shortly a whole series of separate agency initiatives working in support of FCUBE, notably the World Bank, DFID and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), but also the EU, Germany and UNICEF. Indeed, there is a whole PhD dedicated to contrasting just two of these many separate approaches to the support of basic education, the quality improvement in primary schools (QUIPS) of USAID from 1997 and the whole school development (WSD) of DFID from 1998 (Okugawa, 2010).

The next potentially close approach to a sector-wide modality in education came with the development of the ESP of 2003–2015, with strong donor support (GoG, 2003, p. 11):

It is important to stress, however, that the ESP is a whole sector plan. The Government and the Ministry are committed to a whole-sector development approach, i.e. a sector wide approach (SWAp), in which every sub-sector and every area of focus within the education sector is considered and in which all internal and external development partners are invited to play a part.

But it is also obvious within the document that there are a variety of approaches possible for DPs. Indeed, the ESP underlines that its funding gaps may be met in a number of ways, including 'by inviting DPs to give their support to the sector, either directly through the budget or projects, or indirectly through technical and other forms of assistance (GoG, 2003, p. 43). Therefore although, 2 years before the Paris Declaration, there was a very strong statement in the ESP about the subordination of external funding to the national vision, MoE process, operational procedures, time-scales, accounting and review,

it would appear, as we have just seen, that in the same document there was a readiness to accept a variety of approaches. As an important pre-Paris declaration of principle, the following propositions deserve to be quoted at length from the ESP:

Propositions for Aid Co-ordination

Shared vision

1. Providers of aid, as partners, will take part⁹ in the development of the ESP and the subsequent reviews of sector performance through attendance as full participatory members at regular ESTAC meetings and by invitation to participate in education Work Groups.
2. Following completion and approval of the ESP, providers of aid will support its national vision and strategies for education development.

Commitment to the SWAP process

3. Providers of aid will commit to the MoE process by ensuring that their structures (for example, operational procedures, time-scales, accounting and review mechanisms) comply with those of the government of Ghana.
4. MoE will work towards the development of Joint Sector Performance Reviews that will embrace the review-needs of all development partners, including aid providers and national stakeholders.
5. Providers of aid, with other development partners, will accept the Joint Sector Performance Review outcomes as satisfying their own review and accounting requirements. There will be no separate reviews. Development partners will be participants in the review process and will ensure that it meets their needs as well as those of other partners (including government).

Mutual confidence and trust

6. MoE will harmonise sector planning, policy and implementation through formal arrangements that involve its agencies and any other ministries engaged in the delivery of education (in the broadest sense).
7. Providers of aid to the education sector will harmonise their inputs, their planned outcomes and their methodology in support of Ghana's education development. The Donor group will appoint a leader mandated to speak on behalf of the largest group.
8. MoE, in partnership with providers of aid, will investigate the adoption, adaptation and/or the design and introduction of instruments (for example, guidelines, code of conduct, memoranda of understanding) that may assist the aid co-ordination process.

Subordination of external agendas to Ghanaian goals

9. Providers of aid to education will demonstrate that their purpose/policy/agenda for the development of education in Ghana are compliant with those of GoG.

Joint strategic negotiation and communication

10. Development partners, under MoE leadership, will commit themselves to undertake joint negotiation on strategic and planning activities in education.

11. Flexibility should be built into all forms of negotiation and approaches to sector development (GoG, 2003, p. 38).

This is an unusual early statement of Paris Declaration-style principles of harmonization, ownership, mutuality, compliance with and subordination to Ghanaian goals. Coming no less than 7 years before Ghana's own aid policy and strategy sought to advance these principles (in 2010), it was a bold attempt to take the high ground on the coordination of education aid donors, and it was to be implemented through the Education Sector Technical Advisory Committee and through participation in Work Groups. But perhaps the last line (above) gives the reason that this ESP initiative did not develop into a full SWAP with pooled funding: 'Flexibility should be built into all forms of negotiation and approaches to sector development'.

After all, even Rwanda had acknowledged that some donors could not follow its funding preference for unearmarked budget support, and that, indeed, there were some special advantages to some forms of project support:

3.8. The government recognises that not all donors are able to provide support in the form of budget support. Furthermore, it recognises that project support brings with it particular benefits in some areas (for example, where the work being undertaken is innovative or pioneering in its nature). Before accepting such assistance however, the government must be satisfied that the assistance is being delivered in an effective and efficient manner in line with GoR priorities, and that the costs to Rwanda of accepting such assistance are minimised.

3.9. After unearmarked budget support, the GoR prefers sector budget support followed by stand-alone projects, which must be on-budget and on-plan. Further, the GoR prefers that donor resources be pooled rather than earmarked for individual projects. (GoR, 2006, pp. 7–8)¹⁰

Be that as it may, the strong optimism around aid coordination in an SWAP was not fulfilled in Ghana following this ESP. In large part this was due to the new President (Kufuor) commissioning a Review Committee on Education (2002) without any initial donor consultation, and developing a subsequent White Paper (2004) and set of education reforms (planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Ghana/Ghana_education_reform_2007.pdf), almost in parallel with the ESP, but this was also perhaps partly due to a recognition of the need for flexibility of approach if all donors were to continue to be accommodated.¹¹

The new government's Review Committee was very aware of the role of donor support in Ghana. On the one hand, it saw certain sectors such as basic education and non-formal education as being very dependent on external donors; on the other, it was arguing strongly that government should solicit external donor funds for TVET, teacher education and polytechnic development. As far as modalities were concerned, the Committee was clear that one of the problems of donor-supported projects was that they do not continue after the initial funding phase, and this raised issues of sustainability. Though little was said about trade-offs among aid instruments, it is interesting to note that the Committee did argue that externally funded activities should be centralized in the PMU:

PMU should have oversight responsibilities for all projects, interventions and consultancies undertaken by development partners, NGOs, etc. for the Ministry to ensure co-ordination, collaboration and sustainability. Such projects should fit into the strategic plans and activities of the Ministry. (GoG, 2002, p. ccxl)

Perhaps surprisingly given the Committee's strong recommendations about more external aid for certain key sectors, and the crucial importance of aid coordination, nothing was said at all about external aid in the White Paper that followed the Committee's report (GoG, 2004). This may be in part explained by the degree of very severe

criticism by several donors of the Committee's report, and not least of its apparent retreat from a pro-poor Education for all approach of the ESP.¹²

Despite the level of criticism by some donors of the priorities in the White Paper, the GoG was not prepared to spell out or implement what the Government of Rwanda declared in its own aid policy of 2006:

The Government will decline any or all offers of assistance where it considers transaction costs to be unacceptably high, alignment to government priorities to be insufficient, or conditionalities to be excessive. Where assistance is offered in the form of stand-alone projects, the Government may also decline proposals that are not shown to be sustainable. (GoR, 2006, p. 8)

Hence, without a SWAP or a single umbrella framework, many different agencies continued to work from 2003 in their very different ways in the education and training sector. Our purpose now is to tease out something of what is involved in these various approaches. We expect to be able to show that the rather black and white categories employed by Ghana's aid policy, which reflect the discourse of the Paris Declaration, actually hide a much more complex reality in the hands of different donors with their separate cultures and traditions, as well as in the Ministry of Education (MoE).

Government's Modalities and the Complex Realities of DPs' Aid Instruments

Ghana's aid policy suggests that GBS is their preferred modality and that 'Un-earmarked Sector Budget Support (SBS) shall also be encouraged, especially when defined within a sector-wide approach' (GoG, 2010a, p. 19). No DPs provide completely unearmarked SBS in the education and training sectors, but it would seem that DFID's Support to the Education Strategic Plan (SESP), 2006–2015 is one of the only examples in Ghana of SBS to education (DFID, 2006).¹³ Hence, it may prove a valuable source of our central concern about the role of aid modalities in policy influence and in educational outcomes.

The 10-year frame of the SESP was doubtless encouraged by the Finance for Development meeting in Abuja in May 2006 when the then British Chancellor of the Exchequer pledged US\$15 billion over 10 years in support of education in Africa. However, the SESP is earmarked SBS rather than unearmarked. Over the decade, the earmarking allows for a whole series of different components to be included in the £105 million package, each of these linked explicitly to some of the 10 key policy goals of the ESP, such as access, gender parity, quality of teaching and learning, planning and management. To these ends, there are components for school construction and other access-related incentives; a series of gender-sensitive activities from separate toilets to girls' scholarships; and support to key advisors in curriculum and quality assurance, as well as support to in-service and pre-service training; improved supervision and professional leadership; support to school performance improvement planning; and further support to key advisors in technical and financial systems and internal audit. In addition to these components, there is a facility termed the Basic Education Partnership and Innovation Fund (under DFID's control jointly with the MoE) for creative use of capacity building and service delivery through NGOs (DFID, 2006).

In other words, within the simple category earmarked SBS, there exists a huge range of different components over which there will have been considerable initial and continuing policy dialogue between DFID and the MoE. This will also have allowed for significant pro-poor targeting within the framework of the SESP.

One of the invaluable dimensions of DFID's sustained presence in Ghana is that they have had occasion to reflect on the changing politics and influences on education policy making from Nkrumah's time up to the present. This kind of policy history is extremely rare in or about agencies but is crucial to giving any depth to the tracking of donor influence and impact on policy.¹⁴ What is remarkable in a 2009 paper, already referred to, by two DFID staff (one in Governance and one in Education) is its readiness to explicitly link education policy to the interests not just of different political parties, but to the 'strong and increasing influence of the economic and political elite on both education and the allocation of resources' (Pedley and Taylor, 2009, p. vi). Thus, the political interest in widening access from education for the few to education for all is, in their view, counterbalanced by the increasing use by elite families of private primary education as a way of later accessing the best publicly funded secondary and tertiary education.¹⁵

Pedley and Taylor also note the 'ability of schools and teachers to resist efforts to make them more accountable', and the impact this has had on so many of the initiatives, most of them donor-supported, to improve quality at the school level (ibid, p. vi). But running across the whole period of analysis they note 'the initial rise and the subsequent decline of donor influence on policy and distribution of resources' (ibid, p. vi). They argue that the time has passed when donors could exercise strong conditionality to ensure that they secured their demands. Their contrast is with donor influence under Rawlings until 2000, and reduced influence under Kufuor and Atta Mills since then. Others, including Ghanaian analysts, would argue that donor influence has far from declined, but has merely taken different channels.

Interestingly, they pursue the rise and fall of donor influence without a great deal of attention to the particular mechanisms or aid instruments used by the different donors at different times. Thus, for a whole period, the two authors suggest that the World Bank and other projects made a difference in the education sector: 'The World Bank evaluation of external donor support over the 15 years from 1988 to 2003 concluded that World Bank projects, supported by contributions from other agencies, particularly USAID and DFID, made a major impact throughout the period from 1988 to 2003' (World Bank, 2004, p. 23). But this does not examine the particularity of the project approach, or whether World Bank, DFID and USAID projects differed materially from each other.

Thus, as against this general statement about positive impact, it is possible to find comments from major evaluations, academic analyses or involved individuals that make it clear that the sheer complexity of project or programme delivery has constantly to be confronted with the challenges of sustainability. Hence, in the case of some of the major DFID projects in Ghana in the very period covered by the World Bank comment, the following argument has been made:

I think DFID project monies for Ghana in the 90s had little long-term effect on teacher training in Science, Maths, Technology & English, despite some good people being there. The work we invested in at Winneba – producing open and distance learning (ODL) materials for teacher training – really went nowhere. (Allsop to King, 25.11.2009)

Similarly, in the major USAID study QUIPS, the final evaluation told an equally sombre tale about project achievement and post-project unsustainability:

When staffing was reduced to the pre-QUIPS level and sometimes lower, QUIPS trained teachers left the project schools and the level of active and supportive supervision diminished. So did school performance. It was also clear that the level of continuing GES [Government Education Service] support necessary to maintain gains was beyond what was possible given Ghana's current education management and funding. (QUIPS, 2005, p. xix)

In a nice touch, where a former Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) staff member in Ghana was comparing the pros and cons of the USAID QUIPS project approach with DFID's systemic support to WSD, through the Ghana Education Service (GES), she reached a conclusion that acknowledged the crucial role of Ghanaian capacity development in both project and system-wide approaches:

This study reveals the possibility that the system-wide or sector-wide approach can promote institutional capacity in the long term. However, at the same time, the weak capacity of the current system is a huge bottleneck to the efficient utilisation of aid funds. Therefore, further study is necessary to determine how to incorporate the advantages of the project approach into sector-wide mechanisms in order to mitigate the weaknesses of the latter approach. (Okugawa, 2010, pp. 222–223)

The Particularity of Project Aid

Having noted a little of the complexity of what may lie behind Ghana's aid policy discourse on the ideal of unearmarked SBS for the real world of donor projects and programmes, we need to look more carefully at the particularity of project aid. It is now commonplace, following Paris and Accra, to hear project aid described as second best. *Ghana Aid Policy* follows this path, but like Rwanda's, it acknowledges that there are situations where Project Aid can play a role; indeed, they use the identical phrase 'innovative or pioneering in nature' as Rwanda does where allowing for project approaches to be applied:

Project Aid

3.11 Project support is often poorly aligned to government priorities, and often carries high transaction costs. Nevertheless, GoG recognizes that project aid can assist the country in attaining the MDGs and its goal of becoming a middle income country if properly targeted and implemented. Project aid will thus be considered based on its sustainability and potential to achieve national development priorities. In particular, project aid will be sought for infrastructure projects that are capital intensive or where projects are innovative or pioneering in nature. (GoG, 2010a, p. 19)

It therefore might be expected in the light of the positioning of project aid in the hierarchy of Ghana's aid policy that it is on the retreat, but in reality in MacCarthy's valuable analysis of DPs' division of labour, all but one of the donors (the United Kingdom) supporting education in Ghana are said to be using project aid (MacCarthy, 2008a, p. 36). This does not of course mean that the 13 DPs connected to the education and training sector are all using exactly the same project modalities. One of the challenges of trying to identify the influence or impact of DPs on Ghana's education policy is that individual DPs have very different approaches in their projects, reflecting different cultures, contexts and traditions. It may be useful to illustrate this, very briefly, from the case of JICA, which has become the largest bilateral agency, since the merger of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and JICA.

Compared to the larger education donors in Ghana such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the WB, the African Development Bank and the Netherlands, Japan has allocated a relatively small amount to the sector, but in terms of influence they have perhaps made a difference. Since 2000, they have supported two projects, one in support of TVET and one in support of science, technology and maths (STM). What are the specific characteristics or chemistry of these projects according to the Japanese? They are argued

to be crucially concerned with Ghanaian ownership, and with capacity development at every level. But at the same time, Japanese expertise (or technical assistance) is also central to JICA projects.

This is particularly the case where there is a crucially important dimension of technology transfer embedded in the project, as with the widespread JICA network of STM projects. The transfer of Japanese insights into the key role of teacher capacity building in Japan has been central in such curriculum development projects in Africa and Asia. But this approach then requires 'walking through the process together, solving the problems together, as an equal partner'. In turn, this then means that if the innovation is to spread nationally, there cannot be the kinds of salary enhancements for Ghanaian staff that are present in so many donor projects, but which we saw earlier make for unsustainability at the project's end. Thus, non-salary benefits become crucial to teacher commitment. But the central principle of JICA's capacity development is that it is not something that is done to Ghana, but that Ghana owns and does to itself.

It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the term 'capacity', whether 'national capacity', 'sustainable capacity development', 'absorptive capacity' or any other example, appears no less than 51 times in the 45 pages of *Ghana Aid Policy*. It argues plainly that 'to deepen country ownership and leadership, GoG will place capacity development at the center of its aid coordination and management efforts' (GoG, 2010a, p. 16). On JICA's side, it should not be surprising that *Effective technical cooperation for capacity development. Ghana country case study* is one of the key documents developed jointly by JICA with other DPs and the GoG just before the AAA meeting in 2008 (GoG *et al*, 2008), or that there are parallel accounts of the role of project management for capacity development on the JICA website.

There is something of a contrast, however, between the salience of capacity development in the discourse of *Ghana Aid Policy* or in *Ghana country case study* and the very real challenges to institutional capacity in the MoE and GES themselves, leading to the hiring of donor-funded advisors, consultants etc to work in the key line departments.

In terms of ensuring impact or lasting influence, however, JICA is clearly aware that the challenge is not simply building policy frameworks for educational development, but ensuring that there is also support in schools and in institutions where learning actually takes place if there is to be a real difference in teacher training or school-based management (JICA, 2010, p. 8).

Thus, it may be possible to argue that JICA's sustained support to capacity development was crucial to the development of the Council for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (COTVET), around which all the other TVET donors now seek to relate their activity. But unlike formal education with its ESP, there is still no national skills strategy for Ghana. Arguably also, despite JICA's general emphasis on linking and grounding policy frameworks to improvements in training centres, there remains a major disconnect between the Ghana TVET policy world and the reality of what happens in Ghana's training institutions.

Hence, what may seem coherent and persuasive at the level of the individual donor can become much more complex and look less harmonized when the other TVET donors are all added to the picture, notably the World Bank, Denmark, the Netherlands, the African Development Bank, and the City and Guilds Centre for Skills Development.

Equally, in the JICA STM project, which has also been supported at the level of junior secondary school for 10 years, and has now gone to scale, it may be possible to consider it, narrowly, as a project that has had impact and influence within its own sphere. The key

issue is to determine what it is about the chemistry and process of this particular project that allows government to own and then mainstream it.

The possible relationship between this long-term project and the results reported in the McKinsey Report in June 2010 will need to be very carefully debated:

Although the challenges are great, several African countries provide examples of the progress that is possible. Ghana and Tunisia recorded the largest gains in the world in science scores from 2003 through 2007 and among the largest gains in maths scores, although more remains to be done. (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010, p. 21)

JICA staff with knowledge of Ghana may doubt whether they could attribute this large gain made in science and mathematics in TIMMS to the INSET project JICA supported since 2000 at the junior high school level. And it is particularly challenging to do so when another key donor, USAID, has been responsible over a whole decade for assessing and demonstrating just how dramatically low the maths proficiency was of pupils in Ghana's primary school system.

Having referred just briefly to a few projects associated with DFID, USAID and JICA, all of which would doubtless be termed 'innovative or pioneering in nature' (GoG, 2010a, p. 19), it may be possible to conclude that the key factor that determines whether such projects become 'irreversible positive innovations' (in DFID's terminology from the SESP, 2006, p. 14) is whether government takes them up. And this, in turn, will relate directly to the degree of policy ownership, capacity and commitment by government in these activities. The same thing may apply to the issue raised earlier by Pedley and Taylor about the 'ability of schools and teachers to resist efforts to make them more accountable', and the impact this has had on so many of the initiatives, many of them donor-supported, to improve quality at the school level (ibid, p. vi). Here again, the crucial role of government in backing, securing and institutionalising potentially successful innovations is directly relevant to this alleged teacher resistance. The real challenge according to some thoughtful Ghanaians is how to change a very conservative professional culture that has inbuilt incentives to maintain the status quo.

In this connection it may be useful to contrast the situation in Ghana on the take-up of successful pilot initiatives with that in the west of China. It would appear that there has been a rather different experience:

China has been unusually receptive to learning from donor-supported education pilots that have shown what works and Ministry of Education has scaled up quickly successful projects from international agencies – where additional value is clear.

The power of demonstrating what works in education reform has spurred the government on to make much-needed reforms. China has showed considerable willingness to learn from innovative pilots from donors who had initially experimented with and successfully implemented programmes to reach marginalised groups. (www.norrag.org/issues/article/1360/en/china-from-recipient-to-donor.-what-have-we-learned.html)

If the role of government, in the Education sector, is one reason why promising innovations and pilots have not been mainstreamed and why negative factors such as the very widespread teachers' study leave procedure are allowed to continue,¹⁶ there are doubtless also explanations in the donor community as to why aid instruments such as the SWAP have not succeeded. The so-called like-minded donors, including the Nordics, which have supported SWAPs in other parts of Africa, have not been present as a group in Ghana, with the exception of Danida, which was pre-occupied with TVET. But we also need to look at the Education sector from the top, not only from the perspective of

Ghana's new aid policy, being driven by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP), but also from a piece of donor collaboration with government that has worked quite effectively: the multi-donor budget support (MDBS).

The View From the Top: Ghana's *Aid Policy* and MDBS

If the education sector is looked at through the lens of Ghana's aid policy, there may seem little that is positive to report. All the education donors are in the project approach mode except one, and that one, DFID, is very clearly in earmarked SBS, not the unearmarked SBS preferred by MoFEP. Although the intention of Ghana's aid policy, closely following the Paris Declaration, is that there should be increasing emphasis on GBS and SBS, and that where project aid exists, 'such support is integrated within SWAPs where these exist, as well as within sector strategies' (GoG, 2010a, p. 25), the reality is that despite Paris the project mode is alive and well in education.

Although the overall aid figures for Ghana between budget support (both SBS and GBS) and project aid in 2010 are \$US 619 million for budget support and \$US 842 million for project aid, the overall total for education from the 13 donors supporting education, covered in the Division of Labour Study, gives a total of \$US 392 million committed for 2008–2010, but no less than \$US 331 million of that is project aid, and just \$US 61 million is budget support (MacCarthy, 2008a, p. 36; Gerster and Ashong, 2010, p. 10). Thus, the profile of external aid to education in Ghana is still distinctly project-based.

At the same time, Ghana was one of the first countries to have an MDBS in place from 2003, with initial agreement from nine donors, now eleven. The amount of aid going through this form of GBS has grown from \$US 277.9 million in 2003 to as much as \$US 451 million in 2010, but the percentage of aid in this modality, which Ghana had hoped might rise to 60 per cent, in earlier drafts of *Ghana Aid Policy*,¹⁷ has actually gone from 27.7 per cent of aid flows in 2003 to 23.8 per cent in 2010. Meanwhile, the proportions of project aid have only moved from 49.3 per cent in 2003 to 44.4 per cent in 2010 (Gerster and Ashong, 2010, p. 11).

What is intriguing to note is that of the 11 donors providing funds through MDBS, no less than seven are also donors to the education sector, including three of the largest MDBS donors, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the United Kingdom. Yet only one of these (the United Kingdom) is not involved in project aid to education. Of course, through the MDBS modality a certain proportion of the total comes to the MoE, and it is generally felt that the education and health sectors have benefited from the MDBS agreement. But the MDBS works through a complex system of agreeing targets and triggers (for the release of funds, and the loss of funds if the targets are not met). Thus, in 2008, two of the 10 triggers were related to education performance, especially in the 53 deprived districts: these had to reach a net enrolment ratio of 77.7 per cent in primary schools, and to ensure that each child had a copy of the three key textbooks (MDBS, 2008, p. 1).

Even though the evaluation of the MDBS (ODI–CDD, 2007) would claim that this budget support mechanism has supported service delivery in education and health, the actual process of agreeing the targets and triggers (which are a new form of conditionality) can be 'confrontational' and extremely time-consuming, as donors still try to insert their interests into the MDBS framework and try to use it to increase their leverage over implemented policies (Whitfield and Jones, 2009, p. 200).¹⁸ In addition, the operation and

verification of performance by the donors can be judged 'more intrusive than appropriate' (ODI-CDD, 2007, p. 51). Significantly, it allows the MDBS donors to get much closer to the heart of the national budgeting process than those involved principally in project aid.

A further major concern thrown up by the ODI-CDD review was 'a deep-seated dissatisfaction within government with the concept of donor-financed technical assistance' (ibid, p. 48). This could be not only a reference to some of the staff in units such as the Funds and Procurement Management Unit (FPMU), the successor to what was established in the late 1990s under Sawyerr, but to the quite widespread process of donors providing salary supplementation for government staff in line ministries or others from outside, to act as advisors in relation to projects, programmes, finance and planning. In other words, it might appear that in pursuit of policy influence, financial accountability or rapidity of implementation, donor-supported staff on higher salaries can be found not just in project implementation units, such as the FPMU, but in the line ministries themselves. Understandably, such staff are hard to mainstream back into the regular civil service positions at the end of the technical assistance or advisory phase.

The MDBS, in 2003, pre-dated the Paris Declaration (2005), the AAA (2008) and Ghana's aid policy (2010a), but it can be anticipated that the frequent high-level meetings around the MDBS are increasingly affected by these later influences. Indeed, an earlier draft of the aid policy was critical of the 'numerous and optimistic policy targets and triggers associated with the MDBS' and felt this narrowness reduced the development effectiveness of aid. However, the measures outlined at the beginning of this article begin to move the discourse from a one-sided situation where the term performance assessment framework (PAF) automatically means donor assessment of the recipient towards one where the government has put all DPs on notice in relation to their performance on the Paris and Accra principles. It is too early to guess how the DP-PAF will mitigate some of the asymmetries of the MDBS process. But conceivably it could eventually make for a more equitable balance between the GoG and the DPs.

There is a third international influence that could increasingly come into play as several of the traditional donors face drastic cuts in their domestic budgets, or changes to more conservative governments. That is a powerful concern with results and with outcomes, whether in projects, programmes, research or capacity building. Britain's DFID is not alone in being required, by its own new coalition government, to review results much more rigorously through its new structural reform plan, its bilateral aid review and its multilateral aid review.¹⁹ In the department's new priorities there is still the honouring of the UK's international commitments to achieve the MDGs, but there is now also 'value for money' and 'wealth creation' (www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/DFID_SRP.pdf). In addition, the UK's National Audit Office (NAO) has been continuing with a series of reports that look at DFID's record on budget support, as well as on performance management, and, most recently of all, bilateral support to primary education.

Such reports deal directly with the issue of aid modalities, as in the report on budget support, but they also, by their sharp focus on outcomes, can raise questions about the existing modalities and aid instruments in different countries. Thus, in the case of the June 2010 report on bilateral support to primary education, all three references to Ghana could potentially raise questions about aid instruments and aid focus: non-formal education's allegedly very high effectiveness, the role of teachers' salaries and pupil attainment. The

following comment on the last of these three could conceivably produce pressures for different kinds of aid approaches or modalities within-country:

Pupil attainment has been poorly measured. DFID has periodically supported initiatives in some countries to improve measurement, but has not consistently supported or required better measurement across its portfolio. The limited data available shows levels of attainment remaining low. Assessments in Ghana, for example, show 11–26 per cent of Year Six students as proficient in English and Maths. There is little or no progress on literacy since the United Nations agreed the Goals in 2000. (NAO, 2010, p. 6)

The kind of recommendations to DFID from the NAO and the Public Accounts Committee (2010) suggests that there may be much more evidence-based work on non-formal education innovation, school performance and learning assessments, as well as comparative reviews of teachers' pay. These in turn may lead to different kinds of policy dialogue with partner governments.

There are similar pressures in other OECD DAC donor countries, notably Japan, where despite the new money announced at the September 2010 Millennium Summit, there are increased pressures for 'aid with a Japanese face', or for results that are directly attributable to Japanese experts, volunteers, equipment and presence in the field, as well as being valuable to Japanese constituencies at home. These pressures for aid visibility are re-enforced by increased insistence for accountability in the use of public funds. They combine of course to re-emphasise Japan's reluctance to participate in SWAPs or forms of budget support where the additionality of Japanese aid would be much harder to determine.

Reviewing the Latest ESP, 2010–2020, from the Perspective of Donor Impact and Influence

The new ESP has been in circulation in various drafts since early 2009, and the November 2009 version features the then minister of education's foreword in Volume 1.²⁰ In terms of our interest in the role of DPs, their coordination, their use of project aid, SBS or MDBS in the education sector, and their involvement in any of the particular challenges of the next decade, there is little or no mention of any of these elements in Volume 1. Unlike the previous ESP, where we noted a substantive, if idealistic, discussion of aid coordination, and a series of propositions concerning it (see above), there is virtually nothing about these issues in the new ESP. DPs are mentioned two to three times in total; aid, aid coordination, aid modalities and instruments, technical assistance, SBS, BS and MDBS, not at all. When it comes to funding the ESP, donors are mentioned as having supported 6 per cent of education funding in the baseline year 2007, and a similar proportion is anticipated for the new ESP.

Arguably, this is entirely how it should be. This is a national document, analysing the present and aiming at the future, and seeking to show how to get there. It does have some sense of history, acknowledging what the goals of the previous ESP (2003) were. But there is very little on what has been learnt over this past decade, whether from local or external initiatives.

By contrast, there is a desperately awful catalogue of what is failing in Ghana's education system, broken down according to the categories of access and equity; decentralization; skills development; teaching and learning; and tertiary. The selected key findings of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis, under weaknesses and threats, present a very grim tale of poor retention of teachers; growing

disparities; lack of policy and low-quality, inefficient skills development; head teacher incapacity to deal with teacher absenteeism; explosion of tertiary enrolments; graduate unemployment and disaffection; increased drop-out; and eventual loss of confidence in the education system (GoG, 2009a, pp. 11–12).

There are some strengths and opportunities mentioned – such as good teaching and learning materials being developed; in-service and pre-service education; and increased accountability through the School Report Card system. Some of the areas where particular donors have been working for years, such as science, technology and mathematics education (STME) or the development of a framework for TVET through the COTVET, are picked out for future selected strategies (even ‘grand strategies’ when it comes to TVET). The six subsector policies are STME, TVET, ICT, teacher education, tertiary and special needs, but in this section there is not a specific set of policies to deal with the massive teaching, learning and management challenges across the ordinary public primary schools we have just mentioned (ibid, pp. 15–18).

When it comes to the detailed strategies and work programme in Volume 2 of the ESP, where the six ESP focal areas (including basic education, second cycle and non-formal) are analysed by the three categories of socio-humanistic, educational and economic, then there is space for all the specific policies on equity, quality and efficiency to be broken down into activities. Here, under collaborating ministries, departments and agencies, the term DPs is used almost 60 times along with other agencies. And only one agency is actually mentioned by name – USAID – in relation to the national literacy programme (GoG, 2009b, p. 24). Therefore, DPs are certainly expected to be around and to be partners over the next decade, in the delivery of a mass of strategic activities, but who and how are not part of the discussion in these two volumes. Nor is the language of Paris and Accra present in any analysis of ownership, alignment, harmonization or mutual accountability between DPs and the GoG.

And yet there is no shortage of grand strategies, even in the two subsectors of STME and in TVET, which are likely to look to donors for lessons learned and good practice internationally: ‘introduce science and TVET innovations within the system’; ‘develop a world-class workforce’; ‘promote productivity in the informal sector through TVET’; ‘recognize prior learning as a basis for TVET’; ‘develop a National TVET Qualifications Framework’ (GoG, 2009a, pp. 15–16). These and many other objectives are already on COTVET’s agenda, and, as we mentioned above, multilateral and bilateral donors are closely involved. There are similarly large plans that could involve donors in the areas of literacy, quality improvement, assessment and accountability. How these are to be managed, as innovations and pilots, in deprived or less deprived districts, and how sustained or mainstreamed at project end, is not discussed at all.

Arguably, the MoE, by now, knows as much as it needs to know about how its education DPs work, which use the FPMU, which are also MDDBS members, what technical assistance, capacity-building and consultancy support are available from each, and what are their ongoing projects and programmes. It may have been accepted long ago that this particular constellation of donors and their preferred modalities, and even their legal requirements of accountability, have not made possible pooled funding and a full SWAP either in formal education or in technical and vocational skills development. Whether it is the case now, as Little argues, that the space in which donors can act and negotiate appears to have become ambiguous (Little, 2010, p. 35), or rather that it is only too clear to the MoE with whom they can work and how, it is certainly the case that the new ESP has no specific propositions for greater aid coordination. On the MoE side, it may also be

true that they continue to be very open to new externally funded proposals and initiatives that can be linked to the massive number of challenges just documented in the ESP, and especially in educational outcomes. In any event, the donor influence and impact upon the policies of the new ESP appear very different from the ESP of 2003, whose first proposition was as follows: 'Providers of aid, as partners, will take part in the development of the ESP' (GoG, 2003, p. 35).²¹

Concluding Remarks

This does not mean that the Paris and Accra processes, or indeed the Ghanaian enthusiasms for aid coordination of 10 years earlier, have had no impact. USAID would not have commissioned a 'Review of USAID Ghana compliance with the principle of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness' just before AAA in 2008 (MacCarthy, 2008b) and taken subsequent actions on its recommendations if this were the case. Nor would JICA, GTZ and UNDP have commissioned work, also in mid-2008, on the crucial issue of effective technical cooperation for capacity development if they had not wanted a joint discussion about different patterns of capacity building and technical assistance to be available in the wider debate around the AAA. Now, 3 years later, these donors and the other DAC donors are taking very seriously the GoG priority of moving Paris and Accra to the next stage with the DP-PAF. Ghana may not have managed yet to get the major non-DAC donors into this process, but the DAC donors are certainly actively participating.

There are, however, at least two possible disconnects, already alluded to, with this ongoing and perhaps more symmetrical process of aid coordination and management in Ghana led by the MoFEP. The first is a disconnect between MoFEP and the other line ministries whose interests in the centralizing agenda of MoFEP and its preference for GBS may be at odds with long-standing traditions of working with project aid and long histories of ministry cooperation with multiple donors. In the case of the MoE, the experience of education being reduced in MDDBS to just two or three triggers may contrast with the much more expanded policy dialogue that is possible on project aid as well as on DFID's earmarked SBS.

The more serious and enduring disconnect in Ghana is between policy and strategy on the one hand, influenced by Paris and Accra or not, and the reality of what actually happens in classrooms, vocational training institutes or district education offices on the other. Whether donors were more directly involved in developing ESP policy in 2003 or whether they have been kept more at a distance in the ESP of 2009/2010, there continues to be a chasm between beautiful policies and education realities – if we are to recognize the weaknesses and threats to learning in ordinary public schools that the ESP admits to. This may suggest that the central issue is not only organising the alignment of donors to Ghanaian-owned policy, but also interrogating why these national education policies, however influenced by different donor modalities, have had so little impact on practice. A first reaction to this enduring tension between policy and educational outcome comes from a long-term Ghanaian analyst of education:

I have a simple answer: these national policies have never truly reflected a solid knowledge base of realities and opportunities that might hinder or promote change. (Analyst to K. King 21.5.11)

All the main donors that have sought for 20 years, over three different presidencies, to support Ghana's education system could testify powerfully to the continuing disconnect

between the achievement of policy coherence and the reality of under-achievement in classrooms. At the national level, there are multiple continuing issues of institutional capacity; and certainly one part of that incapacity or ‘solid knowledge base’, as Pedley and Taylor (2009) argue, is that many of those making educational policy in Ghana experience a very different reality from the majority through the attendance of their own children in private, high-quality, English-medium primary schools.

But as we have commented on JICA’s approach to education support in Ghana earlier in this article, it may be appropriate to end with one of their staff’s view of the enduring policy–practice divide. It encapsulates so many of our comments on the challenges of understanding in the policy-making community, the realities of teaching and learning outcomes in ordinary Ghanaian classrooms, and the limits of changing aid modalities, following Paris and Accra, in improving these:

The field study was a most enlightening experience. The view I got through the windscreen of a four by four land cruiser as an expatriate officer working at the Ghanaian Ministry of Education, and what I saw, heard, felt and smelt as a mere *oboroni* (foreigner) making good use of public transport or on foot was very different. I could not help but wonder if I had really seen the country and the dynamism of people’s lives up to that point. This apprehension scared me as well, as I came to realise that I was handling the JICA education aid policy to Ghana without having captured what was really going on outside of my office. This realisation humbled me deeply. (Okugawa, 2010, p. 223)

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Notes

1. Four years earlier in July 2006, Rwanda had developed its aid policy, the year after the Paris Declaration (Rwanda, 2006). It followed the main lines of Paris but was a very strongly worded statement of government ownership.
2. There were no responses from non-traditional donors, including from the BRICK countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Korea (Gerster and Ashong, 2010, p. 34).
3. The 42 interviews and the extended e-mail correspondence since March 2009 have informed this article, though there are only a few direct quotations from these sources. Leslie Casely-Hayford is currently completing a paper that will draw more extensively and explicitly on the interviews, though the great majority will be anonymised.
4. See *NORRAG News* 44 (www.norrag.org/issues/44/en/a-brave-new-world-of-emerging-non-dac-donors-and-theirdifferences-from-traditional-donors.html). See also King (2011) on aid effectiveness in relation to fourth High-level Forum in Busan.
5. Ghana’s progress on the MDGs, at the September 2010 summit, reflected more on the previous government that had been in office until the election at the end of 2008.

6. This has been analysed separately in a fascinating paper by Pedley and Taylor (2009) – see later; nevertheless, brief references to this crucial thread of politics will be made where possible and relevant.
7. Another account of the origin of the PMU, however, is that it was more a donor-driven initiative designed to get donor money more rapidly and effectively spent.
8. This should not be interpreted as a criticism of free universal primary education by the Rawlings' government; indeed, it maintained a very strong priority for basic education throughout the 1990s. This would contrast with later governments as we shall note shortly.
9. In fact, there was a very considerable input by donors into the formulation of the ESP according to sources very close to the process. In addition, despite the frequent claims made about MoE leadership of the process, both then and now, there have been some major challenges in capacity at Ministry level.
10. It is widely acknowledged that the Rwandan Government has a stronger hold on their development agenda than Ghana.
11. For details on what became characterized by some donors as a 'dual track' in Ghana, as both the ESP and the recommendations of the White Paper continued in parallel, despite GoG's attempts to demonstrate linkages, see Casely-Hayford and Palmer (2007, pp. 32–33), and Little (2010). The larger background to the dual track, of course, is that the ESP reflected the strong emphasis of the two Rawlings' governments (1992–2000) upon universal basic education, whereas the new president's education review pointed to more and longer access to upper secondary education, as well as to technical and vocational education.
12. An unpublished 'summary statement of donor concerns with the 2007 sector review' commented that 'The shift from the current focus on basic education is also dramatic. Under the ESP 32 per cent of the recurrent budget and 34 per cent of the capital budget is allocated to primary. The costing of the White Paper indicates that the per cent of recurrent expenditure for primary education declines to 25.7 per cent, and the capital expenditure declines to 14.8 per cent' (issues for the Ghana education sector case – 2007) (bilateral donor to King, 22.10.10).
13. It is not widely known, given the view that USAID only does projects, that no less than two-thirds of all USAID's education to sub-Saharan Africa went for budget support, with conditionalities, in the mid-1990s. The World Bank is also sometimes described as providing budget support to education in Ghana, but MacCarthy's (2008a, p. 36) division of labour study places the WB firmly in the education project aid category.
14. For examples of this policy history, see Colclough and De (2010) on India, and King (2007) on Kenya.
15. The identical process is powerfully documented by Mwiria, Assistant Minister of Education for Kenya (2005).
16. Ghana has an extraordinary teachers leave system where at any given time about one-quarter of their teachers are on paid 'study leave' – that is a year off on full pay. This still persists today, perhaps not unconnected with the fact that no less than 24 per cent of MPs were formerly teachers, and that the teachers were strongly represented in the Presidential Review Committee.
17. In 2008, an earlier draft of *Ghana Aid Policy* stated: 'The objective is to achieve a doubling of the proportion of general budget support from the current 30 per cent per annum to 60 per cent per annum by 2010' (GoG, 2008, p. 6).
18. An example of this would be the attempt by some donors to use the MDBS for pro-poor targeting (as in the education triggers just referred to). There is then a tension between the poverty-targeting of some of the donors and government's ideal of general budget support.
19. The results of these crucially important reviews were published on 1 March 2011.
20. Atta Mills's inauguration as new president was in January 2009.
21. In fact, there has been considerable support to the ESP process from one or two key donor-supported consultants/advisors.

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